Europe’s exposure to cascading risks
Why Europe is unusually exposed to disruption, and how a shock in one system spreads into others
For the near-term assessment of depleted buffers and risks through winter, see Europe’s risk outlook: September 2026–March 2027.
Why Europe is exceptionally vulnerable
Europe depends on stable natural systems at a time when those systems are being pushed beyond their limits. Seven of nine planetary boundaries have now been crossed. Within Europe, 81% of habitats of community interest are in a poor or bad state, with most continuing to decline. Degraded soils, rivers, forests and wetlands retain less water, provide less protection from extreme weather and recover more slowly after disruption.
At the same time, global resource extraction has tripled in fifty years and could rise by another 60% by 2060. Europe’s food, energy, industrial and infrastructure systems rely on large flows of imported fuels, fertiliser, minerals and components. Many come from a small number of producers or travel through a small number of routes. High demand, concentrated supply and weakening ecological buffers leave little room when normal conditions fail.
Europe’s dense connections add to the exposure. The European Climate Risk Assessment finds that Europe’s climate-sensitive systems and infrastructure networks are closely connected. A failure at one point can affect other sectors, regions and countries. Cross-border infrastructure and common markets can help countries support each other, but they can also carry disruption rapidly across the continent.
How disruption spreads
Risk cascades occur when a shock in one system triggers problems in others through a shared dependency. A power failure, for example, can stop communications, payments, water pumps and rail because each needs electricity.
The consequences then move beyond the services first affected. Reduced supply raises prices and interrupts production. Households lose purchasing power, firms lose output and governments come under pressure to intervene.
Whether the cascade stops depends on what remains available. Alternative suppliers and routes, stocks, spare capacity, healthy ecosystems, household resources and functioning institutions can contain the damage. When these buffers are already depleted, smaller disruptions travel further.
The response can also become part of the cascade. Emergency subsidies, extra water abstraction or protectionism may relieve the immediate pressure while preserving the original dependency or shifting costs elsewhere. Pressures are especially difficult to contain when they arrive together and draw on the same depleted buffer.
The four cases below show this process under different conditions.
Summer 2026: drought connects food, power and freight
Prolonged drought connected food, power and freight through Europe’s rivers and reservoirs. Lower soil moisture and pasture reduced agricultural output, while depleted reservoirs and warmer rivers constrained hydropower and reactor cooling. France recorded its lowest maize harvest in about fifty years.
Low water on the Rhine added another pressure. Barges carried as little as a fifth of their normal load, restricting the movement of fuels, fertiliser, grain, metals and industrial components. The disruption was estimated to reduce German production by 0.2% in the third quarter. At the same time, France cut 6.3 GW across eight nuclear reactors because rivers were too warm for normal cooling, just as heat increased electricity demand.
Food production, electricity and freight were drawing on the same depleted water system. The resulting losses reinforced one another through lower output and higher transport and energy costs. Extra abstraction could protect supply for a time, but would leave farms, ecosystems and power generation still more exposed to the next dry period.
Strait of Hormuz 2026: an energy shock reaches production and households
The disruption around the Strait of Hormuz did not remain an oil shock. Oil, diesel, jet fuel and gas prices rose together. At their peaks, Brent crude rose by more than 90%, diesel by 75% and jet fuel by 170%, while European gas prices rose by around 31%.
The increases passed quickly into freight, aviation and energy-intensive production, raising the cost of chemicals, metals, glass, plastics and other goods. Farms were hit from two directions: diesel powered machinery and transport, while gas was the main input for nitrogen fertiliser. The global fertiliser price index was projected to rise by more than 30% during 2026, carrying part of the shock into the next growing season.
With few immediate substitutes, higher energy costs reached food prices, household bills and the wider economy. The ECB estimated that the shock would reduce euro-area growth by around 0.4 percentage points in its first year. Governments then announced €14.5 billion in support, shifting part of the cost onto public budgets.
Iberian blackout 2025: shared infrastructure fails together
When electricity failed across Spain and Portugal in April 2025, communications, transport, payments, refrigeration and water pumping failed with it. Around 35,000 stranded rail passengers required assistance, retail payments fell by 55%, and refineries took up to a week to restart. Economic losses were estimated at up to €1.6 billion.
The same failures weakened the response. Traffic and communications disruption obstructed emergency services and fuel deliveries just as hospitals lost access to digital records and diagnostic equipment. Electric pumps stopped water supplies and dialysis. It took almost five hours to establish how much generator fuel remained across Portugal’s health system, and one major maternity hospital came within an hour of exhausting its supply.
The blackout showed the limits of planning for each service separately. Backup power could keep a hospital running only while fuel, water, communications and transport remained available to support it.
Valencia floods 2024: extreme rainfall meets depleted buffers
In October 2024, a slow-moving storm dropped 491 mm of rain near Valencia in eight hours. Human-induced warming increased the six-hour rainfall rate by around 21% and expanded the area receiving more than 180 mm by 55%. But the rain did not fall on an untouched landscape. Drought and degraded soils had weakened its ability to absorb water, while rain earlier that day had saturated much of the capacity that remained.
The later downpour met steep catchments, dense floodplain development, late alerts and exposed infrastructure. Water swept through communities, farmland and industrial areas while many people were still on roads or at work. Transport, power, communications, water and emergency services failed together. More than 230 people were killed and around 15,000 displaced.
Damage to roads, rail, utilities and productive assets then slowed emergency access and stopped economic activity. Total damage was estimated at €10.7 billion. The costs continued after the water receded: Spain mobilised €16.6 billion in support and reconstruction measures, while delayed warnings and a fragmented response weakened public trust.
What these crises have in common
The trigger differs in each case, but the mechanism is consistent. A shock reaches a shared resource or infrastructure. Failures then reinforce one another across essential services, production and household finances. The damage is greatest where ecological, technical, financial or institutional buffers have already been depleted.
Resilience therefore depends on more than responding effectively to the first failure. It depends on whether essential needs can still be met when several connected systems are under pressure, and whether recovery reduces the exposure that allowed disruption to spread.
The five actions for putting Europe’s resilience into practice can be found here.
Further reading
- Climate KIC. (2023). Pathways2Resilience launches to accelerate climate adaptation in European regions.
- European Environment Agency. (2024). European Climate Risk Assessment.
- European Environment Agency. (2024). Governance in complexity: Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions.
- European Environment Agency. (2025). Europe’s environment 2025.
- International Resource Panel. (2024). Global Resources Outlook 2024.
- Planetary Boundaries Science. (2026). Planetary Health Check 2026.
- Scholten, C. et al. (2025). The future of water availability and use in the EU. European Parliamentary Research Service.
- Systemiq. (2022). Circular Economy and Resilience: How circular economy levers can promote European resilience.
- Systemiq, University of Oxford ZERO Institute and Clingendael Institute. (2026). The Resilience Agenda.
- Systems Transformation Hub. (2024). Building a secure and thriving Europe: Policy Brief No. 2.
- World Resources Institute. (2022). How nature-based solutions can protect businesses from water risks.
- World Resources Institute. (2024). Energy Minerals and Circularity.